Reform VS Oppression: The Impact of Wiehahn Commission on Labour Relations in South Africa

The history of labour relations in South Africa follows a somewhat winding path from its start with the import of trade unionism to South Africa from Britain in the latter stages of the nineteenth century (Jones, 1985a:160). Since this time, the heavy hand of the South African government has been all too involved in industrial relations as is evident in the legislation passed regarding industrial relations. The problem is that the labour legislation created divisions amongst workers on the grounds of race and accorded certain advantages and privileges to particular races (white, coloured and Indian) at the expense of another (black). Based on racially discriminating legislation, the South African system of industrial relations served to further and protect the interests of a certain group of workers, namely the skilled and the white (and to a much lesser extent, coloured and Indian workers) (de Clercq, 1979:70-71). Since the passing of the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, labour relations in South Africa have undergone some significant developments; one of the most noticeable is the government’s shift in approach from repression to reform with regards to black trade unions (Maree & Budlender, 1987:118). This essay aims to provide an analysis of the impact of the Wiehahn Commission of 1977 and its report of 1979 on labour relations in South Africa. To this end, the essay will provide a brief background history of labour relations in South Africa; it will identify and elaborate on the different phases of black trade unionism in South Africa. Furthermore, having sketched a background scenario, this essay will shed light on the developments and causes that led to the establishment of the Wiehahn Commission, and finally an analysis will be provided on the impact of the Commission on labour relations in South Africa (de Clercq, 1979:70; Jones, 1985a:160; Maree & Budlender, 1987:118).

 

By the start of the 1970s, the industrial relations system functioning in South Africa was of a dual nature (Maree, 1985:286; Maree & Budlender, 1987:116; de Clercq, 1979:69). With the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, and then later amended substantially in 1956, the state created one system of industrial relations for white, coloured and Indian workers and another for black workers (Maree, 1985:286; Maree & Budlender, 1987:117; de Clercq, 1979:69, 71). The main aim of the state was to offset black workers from establishing and joining trade unions, and so incorporated white, coloured and Indian trade unions into machinery that allowed the state effective control over them. On the other hand, the government developed alternative means of industrial representation for black workers, which took the shape of plant-level management-controlled committees (Maree & Budlender, 1987:117; de Clercq, 1979:69, 71). The Act accorded the right to establish and join registered trade unions to white, coloured and Indian workers and gave them access to the general industrial relations apparatus including conciliation boards and industrial councils. These trade union rights were not extended to black workers, as black men and women did not fall within the formal definition of ‘employee’ as was recognised by the Act (Maree & Budlender, 1987:117).

 

Although black workers were denied access to registered unions, it was legal for these workers to establish and become members of unregistered unions. These unregistered unions faced a serious challenge in that these unions were not recognised in the official dispute-resolution and negotiation machinery (Jones, 1985a:160). As a result the only means of gaining recognition was through negotiation with individual employers for substantive and procedural agreements that were not criminally binding. The government, not at ease with the existence and development of these unregistered black trade unions, perceived them as sleeping giants with the potential to cause industrial instability and to call for political and social unrest. The state as a result relied on a heavy arsenal of repressive and coercive security legislation to outlaw organizations and ban union leaders. Furthermore, the repressive arm of the state was used to avert marches, prevent meetings, picketing and demonstrations (Jones, 198a5:161).

However, at the same time the state realised that force and coercion alone was not sufficient to control black workers and offered the absorption of black workers into government-controlled machinery. The Botha Commission of 1951’s recommendation of incorporating black unions into “separate industrial conciliation machinery” (de Clercq, 1979:72) resulted in the passing of the “Native Labour (Settlements of Disputes) Act” (Jones, 1985a:161), which was later to become the Bantu Labour Settlement of Disputes Act of 1953. This act provided for the establishment of works committees, which were largely management-dominated, allowed for plant-level consultation and a long-winded dispute-resolution procedure which still made strike action illegal (Jones, 1985a:161). The aim of the act was to counter the development of black trade unions by offering another medium for consultation and thus taking the initiative away from unregistered unions, and hoping that the unions would naturally cease to exist (de Clercq, 1979:72; Jones, 1985a:161; Maree & Budlender, 1987:117).

 

When the strike wave erupted across Durban in 1973, the system of works committees had revealed itself as a wholly incompetent means for articulating workers’ complaints. In an attempt to revive the system, the government amended the 1953 Act so as to provide for the establishment of factory-based liaison committees. These committees would be composed of half management and half worker, but still negotiation rights were denied (Maree & Budlender, 1987:117-118; de Clercq. 1979:73). The liaison committees were rejected by black workers, and as a result, independent black trade unions emerged in South Africa’s main industrial hubs. The state once again amended legislation and produced the “Black Labour Relations Regulations Act of 1977” (Maree & Budlender, 1985:118), extending the right to negotiate plant-level agreements regarding working conditions and wages, a move that proved too little too late (Maree & Budlender, 1985:118).

 

The first phase of black trade unionism in South Africa started in 1919 when Clements Kadalie founded the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union of Africa (ICU) in Cape Town (Gould IV, 1987:496; Jones, 1985a:161; Maree, 1985:280). The union spread widely and developed into a national trade union, and even established branches outside South Africa. The ICU was not a trade union in its strictest form, but was also a protest movement. The membership of the ICU peaked during 1927-8 boasting 100 000 – 250 000 members (Jones, 1985a:161). The inability of the union to make good on its “promises of change, harassment by White farmers, state repression, as well as internal corruption and divisions” (Maree, 1985:280) led to its dramatic collapse by 1930 (Gould IV, 1987:496; Jones, 1985a:161; Maree, 1985:280).

 

The second wave of black worker organization in South Africa starts in 1940 and lasts until 1946. This phase of increased black worker militancy is in large part due to World War II. The fact that many skilled white workers joined the war effort resulted in a high demand for black workers and as a result increased their bargaining power considerably. In 1941 the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) was founded, with its most important union being the African Mine Workers Union (AMWU) (Gould IV, 1987:496; Jones, 1985a:161; Maree, 1985:280). CNETU, made up of 119 unions with a total membership of 158 000 by 1945, was severely weakened by internal divisions and by “restrictive War Measures” (Maree, 1985:281; Jones, 1985a: 161) propagated by the state. In 1946 the AMWU went on a massive strike involving 76 000 workers which was harshly crushed by the state. This heavy state repression alongside the passing of the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, was used to remove much of CNETU’s leadership and by 1953 the organization had all but “ceased to exist” (Maree, 1985:281).

 

The third wave of black trade unionism began with the establishment of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). Consisting of a few surviving CNETU unions and a few other progressive unions. SACTU, committed to non-racialism, perceived the struggle for economic emancipation to be inextricably tied to black political liberalisation (Gould IV, 1987:496; Jones, 1985a:161; Maree, 1985:281). As a result, SACTU aligned itself with the Congress Alliance, which was made up of the “African National Congress (ANC), the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People’s congress and the (White) Congress of Democrats” (Maree, 1985:281). SACTU’s downfall came as a result of its economic activism and overtly political involvement bringing it repeatedly into clashes with the state, in which it was crushed. Furthermore, the federation’s demise can be attributed to its subordinate position in the Congress Alliance (Maree, 1985:281; Jones, 1985a:161; Gould IV, 1987:496).

 

The fourth wave of black trade unionism began between 1970-72, when a number of white intellectuals and academics attempted to revive the virtually non-existent black labour movement. What was to become trade unions started out as advice bureaus for workers in Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg (Maree, 1985:287; Jones, 1985a:162). The revival in Cape Town and Durban was characterized by the wide spread involvement of white lecturers and students, which resulted in the establishment of the General Workers Union (GWU) and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), respectively. The Johannesburg-based revival produced the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) (Jones, 1985:162). These independent trade unions (these unions are referred to as independent because of their tireless efforts and attempts to be free of state control, white unions and capital, and it aids in distinguishing these unions from other black trade unions which were affiliated to the Trade Union Council of South Africa (Maree, 1985:279)), experienced rapid growth despite the dual system of labour relations which prevailed in South Africa. These unions were still denied access to the official negotiation and dispute resolution machinery, as well as formal recognition, and as a result had to operate through the management-dominated works councils mentioned above (Gould IV, 1987:497).

 

The history of labour relations in South Africa and the development and evolution of black trade unions experienced a significant development in 1973. The eruption of massive strike action across Durban in that year brought to the state’s realisation that “more fundamental change” (Maree & Budlender, 1987:118) was necessary if it were to regain control over black labour. As a result the state “appointed two commissions of inquiry into labour legislation” (Maree & Budlender, 1985:118). The Wiehahn Commission was appointed to make recommendations with regards to labour relations and the use of “labour for laws administered by the Departments of Labour and Mines” (Maree & Budlender, 1987:118). In short, the aim of the Wiehahn Commission was to examine the state of labour legislation. The aim of the Riekert Commission was to modify the “influx control system” (de Clercq, 1979:74) and other matters relating to labour. The appointment of these two commissions must be perceived as part of a wider state strategy designed to re-establish economic and political stability (de Clercq, 1979:74). The Riekert Commission is beyond the scope and focus of this essay and no further attention will be given to it (Maree & Budlender, 1987:118; de Clercq, 1979:74; Marsh, 1982:52).

 

There were other significant forces compounding the state’s decision to appoint the commission of inquiry. Not only had the state come to the realisation that force and coercion were no longer sufficient mechanisms of control, but since the Durban strikes of 1973, South Africa experienced an intense increase in black worker militancy which culminated in high levels of political and industrial conflict. South Africa further experienced a shortage of skilled workers, a shortage which very well threatened economic growth. This threat was of considerable concern to the apartheid regime as it required a strong and functioning economy which would provide the resources needed to maintain capitalist and white domination (Maree & Budlender, 118-119; Maree, 1985:295; de Clercq, 1979:75). Furthermore, the South African state was facing increased international pressure over apartheid and racial domination and the possibility that this could lead to disinvestment in South Africa and disrupt trade (Maree & Budlender, 1987:119; Maree, 1985:295; de Clercq, 1979:75).

 

The Wiehahn Commission recommended that black workers be allowed to establish and join registered unions and that union membership should be extended to workers of all races (Maree & Budlender, 1987:119; Maree, 1985:296; de Clercq, 1979:75-76; Terreblanche & Nattrass, 1994:199). Furthermore, the Commission recommended that the legal reservation of specific occupations for whites be abolished and the establishment of an industrial court which would “interpret labour laws and adjudicate on issues such as unfair labour practices” (Maree, 1985:296; Maree & Budlender, 1987:119). The Wiehahn Commission’s argument was that the registration of black trade unions would incorporate them into the same government control and regulation exercised over registered unions. These controls obliged unions have their accounts audited regularly, to provide the industrial registrar with standard information regarding the union and to draft its constitution in compliance with the specification stipulated by the Industrial Conciliation Act (Maree, 1985:296; Maree & Budlender, 1987:119; de Clercq, 1979:76). The Wiehahn Commission further recommended that black workers be allowed into apprenticeship positions, which would ultimately allow these workers to be employed as skilled artisans; the abolition of separate workplace facilities on the grounds of race (Jones, 1985a:162).

 

Initially the government did not accept all the proposals which the Commission had made, and rejected specifically the recommendation regarding which trade unions rights be extended to all black workers and permitting the operation of multiracial unions (de Clercq, 1979:75). The Industrial Conciliation Act was amended in 1979, extending trade union rights to black workers engaged in fixed employment and urban rights only, but in September the state had undergone a change in policy and trade union rights were extended to migrant workers (de Clercq, 1979:75). The state warily accepted the Commission’s major proposals, and through this the state aimed to co-opt black trade unions into the official industrial relations machinery and to extend its control over the rapidly growing unions. This development in South African labour relations is a watershed event, for the first time in the history of South Africa the state’s approach to black trade unions underwent a qualitative shift from one of repression to that of reform (Jones, 1985b, 217; Maree, 1985:296; Maree & Budlender, 1987:120). However, the state’s concession of legal rights to black unions should not be interpreted as a moral about turn by the state, but a means of regaining control over black labour (Maree & Budlender, 1987:120).

 

The impact of the Wiehahn Commission on labour relation in South Africa was almost instantaneous. The resulting amendment in 1979 of the Industrial Conciliation Act was largely perceived with scepticism and mistrust by the independent black unions. As a result, many black unions chose not to register, because they viewed registration as a means of state control (Maree, 1985:296; Maree & Budlender, 1987:120). It must be mentioned that legislative regulations were not extended to unregistered unions and as a result by refusing to register, the unions remained legal, and also free of the legal stipulations of the Industrial Conciliation Act. This coupled with the impressive gains and advances made by the unions such as, an increase in their numbers from roughly 70 000 to 300 000, the emergence of overtly political unions, and a striking increase in the number of signed recognition agreements. Furthermore, a resurgence of black worker militancy and a resulting increase in strike activity led the state to once again amend the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Act was amended in 1981, and its name was changed to the Labour Relations Act (Maree & Budlender, 1987:120; Maree, 1985:296-297).

 

The Labour Relations Act of 1981 extended the controls initially imposed on registered unions to unregistered trade unions as well. Furthermore, the restrictions concerning strikes and political involvement were intensified and also extended to unregistered unions (Maree & Budlender, 1987:120; Maree, 1985:296). To some extent the amendment of the Act in 1981 was also a extension of the Wiehahn Commission’s proposals in 1981. The Act finally abolished the dual nature of the industrial relations system “by deleting all reference to race in the act and repealing the Black Labour Regulations Act” (Maree & Budlender, 1987:121). Furthermore, the power of the industrial court was increased in 1982, and in 1983 access to conciliation boards was granted to unregistered unions. Initially, the industrial court delivered a number of judgements that increased the rights of workers in the work-place, and as a result increased the strength of unions relative to that of management (Maree & Budlender, 1987:121). Of the highest importance is the fact that the independent black trade unions have to a large extent won the right to organize workers in the factory and have started to reach a level where managerial prerogative is coming under challenge from the independent unions. The independent unions have clearly challenged the managerial power in the unilateral dismissal of workers (Maree & Budlender, 1987:121; Maree, 1985:297).

 

Furthermore, the impact of the Wiehahn Commission and its recommendations are clearly visible when one looks at the policies and strategies of the independent unions and employers with regards to negotiations. With closer inspection one finds that these policies and strategies can bee grouped to define three clear phases, each of which will be dealt with below. In the first phase, stretching from 1975-82, the independent union movement is characterised by three main principles, namely, non-racialism; shopfloor, plant-level organization and worker control (Morris, 1990:149). This phase largely encompasses the emergence of the independent union movement, and as a result the unions are numerically weak, and furthermore, they are largely plant-based. The independent union movement’s reaction to the industrial council and national level bargaining was strongly influenced by their “experience of industrial conciliation structures” (Morris, 1990:150) on the plant floor. These unions as a result regarded the industrial council system as essentially racist and bureaucratic – a system too interlinked with and reliant on state involvement. As a result, in this first phase, the unions, being numerically small, and largely plant-based, are not only opposed to the industrial council because it represents a system of racial oppression and white dominance, but because their bargaining power at national level is very weak, if it exists at all. Furthermore, because the unions have focused heavily on plant-based organization, they are weak at national level, the level at which employers are strong. As a result, one sees the employers refusing to acknowledge plant-based negotiations as legitimate, because this is the area where the unions have strength (Morris, 1990:149-152).

 

The second phase in the development of the independent trade union movement herald’s a change in the attitude of employers with regards to shop floor rights. SEIFSA allows the trade union movement some limited rights on the shop floor level, but this does not replace the industrial council system (Morris, 1990:152). In the wake of the 1981 strike wave in the East Rand’s metal industry, unions like the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) experienced phenomenal growth, which almost forced a strategic shift on the part of trade union movement regarding the matter of participation at industrial council level. The union organizers found themselves increasingly incapable of dealing with all the demands being placed on them from their expanding numbers in members and factories (Morris, 1990:153). Thus the unions felt the need to assert their presence at national level but realised that it was not yet strong enough to challenge SEIFSA directly at national level. The result was an urgent to need for campaigns at national level and a shift in the strategic vision of the union movement (Morris, 1990:153). Thus the unions engaged at national level bargaining at the industrial councils, but this more a tactical move than one of principle. The reason for this is that the industrial council would be used to assist in the process of welding the union into a nationally coherent entity (Morris, 1990:154). The principle reason for engaging at the industrial council was to use the forum as a platform for “co-ordinating a national wage campaign, presented formally at the industrial council, but fought out at plant level” (Morris, 1990:154). Plant-based bargaining and negotiation was now not in opposition to the industrial council, but was rather seen as an supplementary addition (Morris, 1990: 152-156).

 

The third phase in the development of the independent union movement sees a merger between MAWU, MICWU and NAAWU, to establish what became known as NUMSA, which pushed up member numbers to 150 000 (Morris, 1990:156). This in turn forced another shift and reformulation of the union’s strategic vision as new organisational requirements were pushed to the fore. In this phase one sees that the industrial council system has now become the bargaining ground of choice for NUMSA, as it had become the biggest union in the industrial council(Morris, 1990:156). On the other hand, some employers and managers, recognising the strength of the union at national level, undergo a shift in their strategies as well as they wish to break away from bargaining at national level and revert to plant-based negotiations, this is an attempt to split the union and the workers up and to undermine the strength of the union at national level. As a result, the union finds itself fighting for and protecting the integrity of the industrial council system. Furthermore, the union’s strategy in this third period is an effort to “integrate organisational requirements at the central level with the basis of the union’s strength on the shop floor; and to integrate wage bargaining at central level with the maintenance of shop steward structures on the factory floor.” (Morris, 1990:159).

 

As mentioned above, the Wiehahn Commission and its report, marks a defining moment in the history of South African labour relations. Through a process of “legitimizing black trade unions and de-racializing the labour situation” (Jones, 1985b, 217) a certain energy has been injected into the labour relations system. The significance of the post-Wiehahn era and the developments that have resulted from it laid the organizational base from which to mount a challenge to the intrinsic inequality in the South African system (Jones, 1985b, 224). Furthermore, one sees a dramatic shift in the state’s approach to black trade union’s, after decades of coercive and forceful repression the state have opted for a program of reform. However, these reforms are not triggered by some moral realisation, but rather it is an attempt to regain control over black labour and to restore political and economic stability to the country (Jones, 1985b, 217; Maree, 1985:296; Maree & Budlender, 1987:120). Finally one sees a dramatic shift in the policies and strategies of both the independent unions and employers with regards to the industrial council system, in terms of the independent union movement this ranged from distrust and opposition to the system to later acting in its defence, a complete about turn. Finally, by extending the right to register to black unions, the state created a political space for these unions; this along with the legality accorded by the state was quickly exploited by these unions (Maree, 1985:303).

 

REFERENCES

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Jones, R. A. 1985b. The Changing Structure of Industrial Relations in South Africa. Managerial and Decision Economics. 6(4):217-225.

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Maree, J., and Budlender, D. 1987. Overview: State Policy and Labour Legislation. In The Independent Trade Unions 1974 – 1984. edited by J Maree. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. pp. 116 – 123.

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Terreblanche, S. and Nattrass, N. 1994. A Periodisation of the Political Economy From 1910. In Work and Industrialisation in South Africa: an introductory reader. Webster, E., Alfred, L., Bethlehem, L., Joffe, A., and Selikow, T. (eds). Randburg: Ravan Press. 190-204